This research examines the evolution of Turkey's foreign policy in dealing with international crises, especially after 2011, when Turkey shifted from a "zero problems" approach to a more active and interventionist foreign policy in regional issues, such as the Syrian crisis and the Eastern Mediterranean crises. The importance of this study lies in its focus on the experience of a regional power in a turbulent environment, reviewing Turkey's success or failure in managing these crises through various tools. This study focuses on outlining the theoretical framework of the concept of international crisis management, analyzing Turkey's tools for dealing with crises, studying the practical models of Turkey's role in regional crises, and assessing the effectiveness of this role in light of international changes. The study is based on the hypothesis that Turkey relied on a mix of soft power (diplomacy, media, aid) and hard power (military) in crisis management. Turkey's intervention was sometimes effective, and at other times hasty and uncalculated. Turkish political ambition clashed with internal and international challenges that impacted its performance. The methodology includes descriptive research, case study, and historical analysis, as these approaches suit the nature of this study. The researcher reached a set of conclusions, including that Turkish policy was driven by expansionist ambitions that did not always align with the international reality. Turkish interventions in crises brought strategic and security dimensions, but sometimes led to its political isolation. Turkey shifted from a policy of "zero problems" to "managing problems through influence." Despite the diversity and intensification of Turkey's efforts, its impact on reaching a final settlement remained limited due to conflicting interests with other countries, in addition to the complexity of the internal Syrian environment and the presence of multiple conflict parties.
